Tuesday, March 18
Here are key details of a report prepared for city airport commissioners about a Nov. 1 shooting that killed a Transportation Security Administration agent at Los Angeles International Airport and wounded three other people before a suspect was shot and arrested:
—An emergency "red phone" picked up by a TSA supervisor at the scene could not display its location to the airport police dispatcher who answered, and an airport-wide audit of red phones and panic buttons found some weren't working.
—Airport police dispatchers were overwhelmed with calls.
—Police and fire officials initially set up multiple command posts that didn't unify for 45 minutes. The command post site was not well chosen and could have endangered responders. Basic supplies including airport plans, maps and aerial photos were lacking.
—Incompatible radio systems hindered response among roughly 20 agencies, and there was no effective method for keeping track of how and where responders were being used. Internal alerts were not sent to all groups of responders. Vehicles left on airport roadways by responders had to be towed.
—The airport has no central public announcement system to communicate information. The airport was not aware of its ability to provide alerts to peoples' cellphones.
—Leadership roles among airport staffers were not properly delineated and those at the airport's emergency operations center lacked sufficient training and were not high enough in rank to get results. Airport officials in the center had nearly no communications with officials at the command post. The airport's emergency management program isn't well defined or widely understood or respected across the agency.
—Airport workers need training in emergency procedures such as evacuations, especially for people with special needs.
—A Fire Department program to train tactical medics to enter danger zones to help victims hadn't been implemented at the time.
—The effectiveness of random patrols by airport police officers is unclear.
—Security cameras need upgrades and possibly technological enhancements.
—Resumption of airport operations was not a high enough priority.
—Law enforcement securing the perimeter weren't given guidance, hindering access by responders, the Red Cross, flight crews, ground crews and other workers. The airport executive director and head of media relations weren't allowed in for a time.
—There have been six risk assessments of the airport in the past decade but no centralized tracking of what has or hasn't been resolved.